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Abstract 
Much of synaesthesia research focused on colour, but not all cross-domain 
correspondences reported by synaesthetes are strictly sensory. For example, some 
synaesthetes personify letters and numbers, in additional to visualising them in colour. First 
reported in the 1890’s, the phenomenon has been largely ignored by scientists for more than 
a century with the exception of a few single case reports. In the present study, we collected 
detailed self reports on grapheme personification using a questionnaire, providing us with a 
comprehensive description of the phenomenology of grapheme personification. Next, we 
documented the behavioural consequences of personifying graphemes using a congruity 
paradigm involving a gender judgement task; we also examined whether personification is 
associated with heightened empathy as measured using Empathy Quotient (EQ) and found 
substantial individual differences within our sample. Lastly, we present the first neuroimaging 
case study of personification, indicating that the precuneus activation previously seen in 
other synaesthesia studies may be implicated in the process. We propose that frameworks 
for understanding synaesthesia could be extended into other domains of cognition and that 
grapheme personification shares more in common with normal cognition than may be readily 
apparent. This benign form of hyper-mentalising may provide a unique point of view on one 
of the most central problems in human cognition – understanding others’ state of mind. 
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Introduction 
Although synaesthesia is traditionally defined as an experience in one sensory modality 
elicited when a stimulus is presented in another modality, it soon became clear that some of 
the most common types of synaesthesia are actually elicited by ordinal sequences such as 
letters, numbers, or time units (e.g., Sagiv, 2005). Indeed, chromatic-graphemic 
synaesthesia (coloured letters and numbers) has been the focus of a multitude of recent 
studies. The perceptual reality of synaesthetic colours was demonstrated (e.g., Smilek, 
Dixon, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2001; Palmeri, Blake, Marois, Flanery, & Whetsell, 2002; 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001) and sceptics could no longer dismiss synaesthetes’ 
reports as confabulatory in origin. However, the emphasis on the perceptual reality of 
synaesthetic experience may have detracted attention from related phenomena in which the 
concurrent experience extends beyond purely sensory imagery and involves, for example, 
spatial, affective, or even social components.  
For example, letters, numbers, and time units may be associated not only with colours but 
also with locations in space (e.g., Sagiv, Simner, Collins, Butterworth, & Ward, 2006b; 
Jonas, Taylor, Hutton, Weiss, & Ward, in press). Individuals with number forms can point to 
a precise location in space associated with each number, but not all of them visualise it. Like 
synaesthetic colours, the spatial patterns associated with ordinal sequences seem to be 
automatically and reliably evoked in a consistent manner (e.g., Smilek, Callejas, Dixon, & 
Merikle, 2007; Jarick, Dixon, Maxwell, Nicholls, & Smilek, 2009). 
However, in addition to colours and spatial patterns associated with graphemes, some 
synaesthetes also report personifying them. A grapheme may be described as having 
gender (e.g., 7 is a male, 8 is a female) or in some cases – a rather elaborate biography 
including personality traits such as “old-fashioned”, “generous loyal friend”, “unimaginative, 
interested in technical subjects, reliable”, and “physically active, inclined to rush about”. Early 
reports of the phenomenon were provided by Flournoy (1893) and Calkins (1893, 1895) but 
it virtually disappeared from the literature for over a century.  
At first glance such reports seem very unusual, but there are several good reasons to 
examine them more closely. First, synaesthesia and grapheme personification seem to co-
occur (Simner and Holenstein, 2007). Additionally, it appears to share some features with 
more familiar types of synaesthesia (the associations appear stable over time and elicited 
automatically; Simner and Holenstein, 2007; Smilek et al, 2007). Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the phenomenon may shed new light on some common mechanisms underlying 
social cognition. Perhaps one reason that interest in synaesthesia is on the rise among 
cognitive neuroscientists may be that we are beginning to see how synaesthesia research 
can inform us about universal cognitive and brain mechanisms (Sagiv & Ward, 2006; Cohen-
Kadosh & Henik, 2007). With this in mind, we embarked on the present project, aiming to 
better understand the phenomenology, behavioural manifestations, and mechanisms 
underlying grapheme personification.   
 
 
Journal of Neuropsychology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp 255-282 
 
Grapheme Personification 
In her surveys of the phenomenon, Mary Calkins referred to the tendency to personify 
ordinal sequences as ‘dramatisation’ - the endowment of physical and psychological 
characteristics to letters, numerals, and musical notes, “so that they often become actors in 
entire little dramas among themselves” (Calkins, 1895, p.100).  In this early survey, the 
prevalence of dramatisation and ‘fondness’ (like or dislike) for graphemes was estimated at 
35% among synaesthetes (N=145).  It was also reported that numerals were more frequently 
liked or disliked than letters, which were more frequently dramatised.  Upon the observation 
of a common aversion to prime numbers and that odd numbers were more often disliked, 
Calkins speculated that numerals rather than letters were more likely to become emotionally 
associated, as they require more intellectual effort.  
Simner and Holenstein (2007) review the early literature and identify several characteristics 
that individuals might associate with graphemes, including: gender, personality and cognitive 
attributes, physical appearance, occupation, as well as relational attributes such as family 
ties, friendships, and other associations, in addition to emotive responses to other units. This 
illustrates the richness of biographical information that may be attributed to graphemes. 
Admittedly, it may even be richer, covering a range of mental states, moods, attitudes, 
interests, and inclination. In addition, graphemes’ relationship dynamics may not be limited 
to affection levels but could include behavioural attributes (such as “P and Q hang out 
together quite often”). 
The term Ordinal Linguistic Personification (OLP) was coined by Simner and Holenstein 
(2007) to describe such personification of letters, words, numbers, time units, or other 
sequences. They describe a new case of a 23 year old female (AP) and showed that her 
gender and personality associations are consistent. They provided some objective correlates 
of the subjective report, including a Stroop-like paradigm utilising a personal name gender 
decision task in which congruity or incongruity with the synaesthetic gender of the first letter 
speeds up or slows down reaction times, correspondingly. Such data show that OLP reports 
are real, not mere confabulation. OLP is believed to be a variant of synaesthesia in its own 
right since it co-occurs with colour synaesthesia and shares some characteristics including 
consistency over time, automaticity and the involuntary manner in which it is evoked. 
In another study, Simner and Hubbard (2006) showed that graphemes’ colour and gender 
attributes interact: The synaesthetic colour Stroop interference only occurs only when 
incongruent colours correspond to letters with a matching gender, indicating that different 
graphemes may be associated with a single gender node. They also showed that naming 
time for the genders associated with graphemes are slower when graphemes are coloured 
with an incongruent colour associated with a grapheme of a different gender (but unaffected 
when the colour is suggestive of a grapheme with the same gender). This indicates that 
colour may be implicitly associated with gender and further strengthens the conclusion that 
grapheme personification is just as real as grapheme colours.  
Is OLP just a childish habit? Probably not: The attribution of seemingly arbitrary gender to 
linguistic constructs is in fact quite common. This is the case in all languages that have 
masculine and feminine grammatical genders, including for example, Amharic, Arabic, 
French, German, Gujarati, Hebrew, Hindi, Manchu, Polish, Spanish, Welsh, and many more. 
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The significance of the feminine-masculine distinction in grammar goes beyond the 
technicalities of conjugations and declensions; it seems to influence our thought such that 
gendered nouns do capture something of the essence of masculinity or femininity1. It is only 
when a speaker of one such language learns another that they are confronted with the 
horror of discovering that the things may have different genders in other languages (e.g., a 
Hebrew speaker will be perplexed to find out that the grammatical gender of cheese is 
masculine in German, not feminine). Speakers of different languages with irreconcilably 
different noun genders may thus be likened to synaesthetes who disagree on the colours of 
the alphabet. The associations of nouns with gender, like OLP associations are idiosyncratic 
to specific languages and influence other cognitive processes. In our view, this suggest that 
we should perhaps be focussing not only on what makes people who personify graphemes 
different from others, but also try to understand what it may tell us about universal 
mechanisms common to us all.  
 
Object personification  
It should be pointed out that personification is not limited to linguistic constructs. Inanimate 
physical objects are sometimes personified as well. The relationship between grapheme 
personification and object personification is unclear although they sometimes co-occur and it 
is plausible that they may share a common basis (Smilek et al., 2007); in a single case 
study, Smilek and his colleagues describe TE, a 17-year-old synaesthete who personifies 
not only letters and numbers but also household objects, such as furniture. The personalities 
reported by TE are consistent over time. Furthermore, they show that the emotional 
associations she has with graphemes can bias her eye movements. Smilek and his 
colleagues conclude that such personification can be understood as a synaesthesia-variant 
involving complex semantic information. The data we provide here shows that synaesthetes 
who personify graphemes quite commonly personify inanimate objects in their environment 
as well, like TE. 
 
Is inanimate object personification a normal phase in cognitive development? 
In ‘The Child’s Conception of the World’, Jean Piaget (1929) maintains that children exhibit a 
form of animism, i.e., they attribute consciousness to inanimate objects2. The idea has been 
                                                           
1
 Boroditsky, Schmidt, and Phillips (2003) review a series of studies that demonstrate this well. For example, 
when native speakers of German and Spanish are given a list of objects with different grammatical genders in 
the two languages and asked to generate adjectives to describe those objects - they show different patterns. The 
adjectives they generate for each object will be rated as more masculine (e.g., strong) or feminine (e.g. 
beautiful) depending on the grammatical gender of the corresponding noun in their native language, even when 
the test is conducted is English where the most nouns have no particular gender. It can therefore be said that 
grammatical gender is more than a mere convention (at least for native speakers). It should be noted that some 
languages have additional genders or classes: Neuter is fairly common and additional classes could include 
distinctions such as human/non-human or a separate class for edible things; these may shape thought in different 
ways, but this is outside the scope of this paper.   
2
 The idea that toddlers attribute agency to everything as a default assumption echoes the neonatal synaesthesia 
hypothesis (e.g., Maurer & Mondloch, 2005) – the idea that all babies experience some sort of synaesthesia-like 
mixing of the senses until they learn to differentiate them and superfluous synapses cross-wiring different senses 
are pruned. Such pruning may be at least partially lacking in synaesthetes, resulting in the hyperconnectivity 
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challenged since. In particular, it was unclear that animistic/anthropomorphic descriptions 
necessarily suggest genuine animistic thought and not immature language skills (for a 
review of the controversy, see Smeets, 1973). However, adults anthropomorphise inanimate 
objects too. Animistic ideas may be normative in some cultures, but they are also prevalent 
in Western poetry, children’s stories, advertisements, myths, as well as modern fiction. Why 
should we retain a tendency to personify? The instinct to interpret what goes on around us 
as the actions of a living agent seems to be a very safe bet (e.g., Guthrie, 1995). You 
wouldn’t want to mistake the noise made by an approaching predator for the wind blowing a 
few leaves behind you, would you? It is easy to see why a tendency to personify will be a 
selected trait. Moreover, instinctively interpreting events within an intentional stance will also 
be beneficial for quick decision making while interacting with other humans.  
With this in mind, both childhood animism and personified graphemes seem like a small 
price to pay for the advantages of a personification bias not only in childhood but also later in 
life. Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2008) shed some light on factors that may 
contributed to personification in healthy adults and report that lonelier individuals 
anthropomorphise more; they suggest that this may compensate for social isolation. 
Furthermore, the tendency to anthropomorphise is common in old age (Zaitchik & Solomon, 
2008).  
 
The present study 
In the present study, we aim to explore grapheme personification further by employing a 
variety of methods. We seek to estimate the prevalence of personification, and common 
characteristics of the phenomenon (including co-occurrence of object personification and 
some common synaesthesia variants).  Next we provide an objective behavioural correlate 
of personification using congruity paradigms requiring speeded gender judgements. We also 
report a measure of consistency in the synaesthetic attribution of gender and personality. 
Such behavioural measures are commonly used in synaesthesia studies and would thus be 
useful for assessing the extent to which grapheme personification resembles other 
synaesthesia variants. Additionally, we provide some preliminary observations concerning 
the neural mechanisms underlying grapheme personification.  
Another aim for the study is to examine whether personifying synaesthetes score highly on 
empathy. If personification is the result of generally lower thresholds for engaging social 
cognition mechanisms, then we could expect that these synaesthetes will exhibit heightened 
sensitivity to social cues with higher empathy scores, among other measures. High empathy 
has already been associated with mirror-touch synaesthesia (Banissy & Ward, 2007), 
supporting the view that we understand others by simulating their feelings. Although in 
personification of graphemes or inanimate objects, empathy is not directed at another 
human being, it nevertheless involves representing mental states or feelings. Higher 
empathy scores in these synaesthetes will support the view that personification represents 
an extension of normal function rather than flawed social cognition. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
seen in adult synaesthetes’ brains (Rouw & Scholte, 2007). Animistic tendencies presumably cease when 
children can distinguish between living and non-living things.    
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Study 1: Characteristics of Grapheme Personification 
First we sought to delineate some of the characteristics of the phenomenon, examine the 
presence of related phenomena or traits, and estimate how common grapheme 
personification is. Calkins (1895) has already noted that personification is fairly common 
among synaesthetes with coloured graphemes; therefore, we decided to survey a group of 
known synaesthetes who participated in some of our earlier studies.  
Methods 
Participants: Synaesthetes were recruited via our websites and have been tested for 
consistency of their colour correspondences with letters, numbers, and a list of words (for 
further details see Ward & Simner, 2005). They filled out a general questionnaire enquiring 
about a variety of synaesthesia types, related phenomena, and demographic information. In 
a sample of 248 synaesthetes with coloured graphemes, we identified 81 who also reported 
personifying graphemes. 
Procedure: We e-mailed those 81 synaesthetes a structured questionnaire on personification 
and report here data from 34 synaesthetes who responded to our request (8 males, 26 
females) by post or by e-mail (33 complete questionnaires, one incomplete). The items in 
our questionnaire were motivated by anecdotal reports of synaesthetic personification in 
literature (e.g. Cytowic, 2002; Day, 2005) as well as our hypothesis that the phenomenon 
may be utilising some of the mechanisms underlying normal social cognition. We firstly 
asked synaesthetes to specify the genders and/or personalities attributed to individual letters 
of the alphabet (A-Z) and single-digit numbers (0-9), as well as rate on a 10-point scale how 
strong the experience is, from 0 (no feeling) to 9 (very strong feeling). We also asked about 
general features of personification, such as frequency of occurrence, the conditions under 
which graphemes were personified, and whether other symbols were personified.  
Synaesthetes were questioned about when they first began to experience personification, 
and we asked multi-lingual synaesthetes if they personified graphemes in other languages. 
Finally we asked about the personification of inanimate objects (animistic thought) and other 
putatively related phenomena such as mirror-touch synaesthesia (e.g., Banissy, Cohen-
Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009a). 
Results and Discussion 
General features of personification. 
All 34 personifiers who completed the questionnaire were grapheme-colour synaesthetes. 
The frequencies of self-reported basic characteristics of grapheme personification are given 
in Table 1. Most participants attributed both personality and gender to (at least some) 
graphemes (Table 1a). Most of the participants personified  both letters and numbers (Table 
1b). Letters and numbers were largely personified in a similar manner (we did not find 
anyone who attributed gender only to numbers and personalities only to letters or vice 
versa).  
The mean number of graphemes personified by synaesthetes was 26.6 (SD=11), but the 
number of graphemes personified varies widely (Table 1c – based on 33 responses; 1 
incomplete questionnaire was excluded from this analysis). Additionally, 42% of 
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synaesthetes personified at least one punctuation symbol in addition to any graphemes they 
personified.  
 
Table 1.  General characteristics of grapheme personification in synaesthetes.  
(a) Type of Stimulus Personified 
2 (6%) personified numbers only 
4 (12%) personified letters only 
28 (82%) personified letters and numbers 
 
(b) Type of Personification 
5 (15%) Attributed gender only 
7 (21%) Attributed personality only 
22 (65%) Attributed both gender and personality 
 
(c) Number of Graphemes Personified  
21 (64%) personified more than 20 grapheme 
9 (27%) personified between 10 and 20 graphemes 
3 (9%) personified fewer than 10 graphemes. 
 
 
Many synaesthetes who reported personalities for graphemes remarked that they had found 
it difficult to write just one or two words describing a grapheme’s personality, just as it would 
be “difficult to sum up a person you know into just one word”. Indeed many individuals did go 
into greater detail. For example one of the respondents described E as an “even-tempered 
male who can be scholarly or bookish”; G as an older female, “rather old-fashioned”; J as an 
“extraverted sociable man”; O as a male who “likes to be at the centre of a crowd, a bit 
showy”; R as a “person who gets things done, determined, organised, keen”; S as a female 
who “has a lot of friends, loves company, very popular”; Y as a “good chap who will do 
anything for a friend” and so on. Numbers had equally complex attributes. A number of 
personifiers reported ‘knowing’ some graphemes better than others, and many respondents 
also indicated they liked/disliked certain numbers and letters.  For example, one of them 
explained that his fondness for a particular letter influenced its personality; he preferred the 
letters that elicited brighter synaesthetic colours, and disliked the darker graphemes to which 
he also attributed more negative personalities. This is an interesting comment because it 
highlights that at least some synaesthetes may experience graphemes’ attributes as being 
under their control to some extent or subject to change, unlike synaesthetic colours where 
such a flexibility is typically not reported; rather, the colour are “just there”. 
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Age of Onset and Frequency  
Most respondents (85%) indicated that they personified as early as they can remember or 
before the age of 5 (i.e., it appeared to be in place from the early stages of literacy 
acquisition). A further 9% first started personifying between the ages of 5 – 7 years, making 
a total of 94% personifying since childhood – at least from the beginning of reading 
instruction.  Only 6% of personifiers said they had not been ‘aware’ of their personification 
until being explicitly asked about it in the process of this research. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon in synaesthetes to ‘discover’ they have additional synaesthetic experiences only 
when they begin to pay attention or specifically look for certain features or variants, just as 
we may not notice unattended features in a scene (‘inattentional blindness’, ‘change 
blindness’ and other lapses of awareness demonstrate this well; e.g., Kim & Blake, 2005).  
An overwhelming majority of synaesthetes report experiencing personification on a daily 
basis (73%). The remaining participants personified less often. It is possible that the ease 
with which personification reaches awareness may vary between individuals. It may be 
rather automatic for many but only in the fringe of consciousness for some (this would also 
explain why two of them only discovered personification later in life). 
The conditions under which individuals are likely to personify 
Are graphemes personified regardless of the modality of presentation? 84% report 
personifying imagined graphemes, 81% personified when visually presented with a 
grapheme, and 70% when they heard it. This is suggestive of a conceptually driven 
association. However, the majority of synaesthetes (65%) reported experiencing 
personification more strongly and more often when the stimulus is presented in written 
format.  29% reported no difference in the strength and frequency of personification when 
written compared to spoken, and a very small proportion (6%) personified more strongly 
when the stimulus was spoken, rather than written. This is not surprising since graphemes 
are after all units of written language.   
Next, we enquired whether graphemes are still personified when embedded in a word or a 
number. 67% reported personification of individual letters when they saw a word, and 55% 
personified numerals upon seeing a multi-digit number. Indeed, this is consistent with 
Simner and Holenstein’s (2007) demonstration that the synaesthetic gender interfered with 
gender judgment of male and female names. However, in follow-up interviews with a sample 
of our respondents, several individuals noted that they will need to focus on a particular word 
or number; they do not usually stop to think about graphemes’ gender or personalities when 
reading whole sentences or longer passages).  
What determines the gender or personality of a grapheme? 
Participants were asked an open ended question concerning any grapheme characteristics 
that may be predictive of the gender or personality. 79% of participants have noticed an 
association between the genders of personalities and other aspects of the graphemes: Of 
these, 52% reported that the grapheme gender or personality was associated with the 
synaesthetic colour of the grapheme. Other associations where noted with the grapheme 
shape (26%), number parity (18%); and sound (12%). Note that some participants may have 
indicated more than one factor (e.g., colour and shape).  
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We have found the comments provided by synaesthetes particularly illuminating. For 
example, on colour, individual responses included: “graphemes with the same colours evoke 
similar feelings”, “at the end of the alphabet, colours are duller so graphemes are older and 
more boring… letters and numbers with bright colours are fun or optimistic”, “stronger 
colours influence the personalities of letters and numbers more”, “green and warm colours 
are associated with cheerfulness and energy”, “a dark colour is more likely to be male, a 
bright colour is more likely to be female”, “those letters which I see as black in colour tend to 
be ‘irritable’, ‘intolerant’, ‘cold’ etc”.  
On grapheme shapes, individual synaesthetes said: “it could be the pointiness of the shape”; 
“open forms are associated with cheerfulness, angular ones with energy”; “rounded letters 
tend to be more feminine”; “the rounder the letter, the more trustful it is, but it goes along 
with boring and uninteresting”; “male numbers and letters are usually made up of straight 
edges, whereas feminine ones are curved”; and “I like sharp-shaped letters, those with 
curves are less likeable”.  One synaesthete linked shape with the synaesthetic colour a 
grapheme evoked: “Letters and numbers that have similar shapes have the same colour”. 
The subjective reports of synaesthetes with regards to number personification are of 
particular interest: “I feel that all numbers and letters are masculine, but vary in age, 
numbers in particular, 8 is an older version of 4”; “I have a strong bias to see the 
females/odd numbers as having much better personalities… not only are they more likely 
intelligent and vivacious (and less arrogant or stodgy) they are also better looking”; “All odd 
digits are female, even digits are male…in general, even numbers are good, odd numbers 
are bad”; “The numbers developed their personalities when I was 6-7 years old, learning 
arithmetic.  In some way, their personalities are related to the difficulty I had learning ‘math 
facts’ or ‘arithmetic tables’”. 
Some synaesthetes also reported that their personality attribution changed depending on 
contextual factors: “The personality/gender/colour etc. often changes according to its 
context”; “name colours alter extensively when connected to a personality and can alter 
again pertaining to moods”; “there is a bit of a difference regarding capitals and small letters 
and size/style/font”.  One individual also noted “the frequency of letters in the English 
language may influence their personality” – a spontaneous observation recently 
corroborated by Simner, Gärtner, and Taylor (in press).        
Thus, it appears that a number of factors may interact during development, leading to the 
reported correspondences between graphemes, gender and personality. The interactions 
between colour and gender processing described by Simner & Hubbard (2006) are 
consistent with this. However, the subjective reports highlight that colour is but one factor 
contributing to the complex representations personification entails. 
Personifcation in other languages. 
As expected, in our British sample, English was the first language of most individuals.  57% 
of our respondents spoke at least one other language (Range:1-4, Mean=2, SD=1) and 
when asked if they personified alphanumeric symbols in these other languages, 88% of 
them reported anthropomorphising graphemes in one or more of the following languages: 
French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, Italian, Czech, Afrikaans, Greek, and 
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Russian.  One synaesthete reported that she had “to get to know” the letters in her second 
language to see their personality. Interestingly, grammatical gender and synaesthetic gender 
may be in conflict (akin to the ‘alien colour effect’ described by Gray et al., 2006). 
Other forms of personification: Animistic thought 
82% (28 individuals) of the synaesthetes who reported personifying graphemes also 
admitted attributing gender or personality to some inanimate objects. Fruits and vegetables 
were the most commonly personified object (57% of those 28 individuals), followed by 
computers (50%). Does this represent very elaborate personification (thinking of the object 
as a living thing with a mental life of its own) or more superficial labelling? Further 
observation support the former. 71% (24 individuals) attributed feelings to inanimate objects 
with plants being the most commonly reported (79% of those 24), followed by household 
objects (62%). For example, one synaesthetes explained that after she moved to a new flat, 
she felt sorry for many of her household objects who must have been “disoriented and 
disgruntled”. Similarly she was compelled to consider whether the remaining coffee mugs in 
a set would miss their broken companion who was no longer with them. It is important to 
note that synaesthetes are not delusional. Just as they know that the colours they see may 
be visualised very vividly but are not really there, they are also well-aware that inanimate 
objects don’t really have feelings, and yet they quite instinctively think of them as if they did. 
The remarkable association of grapheme personification with animistic thought (and mirror-
touch discussed in the next section) may suggest generally lower threshold for activation of  
social cognition mechanisms, and a more diffused hyperconnectivity involving the social 
brain circuitry (rather than restricted cross-wiring, e.g., between processing graphemes and 
mechanisms involved in personality judgement as suggested by Simner and Hubbard, 
2006).  
The prevalence and co-occurrence of grapheme personification with other variants of 
synaesthesia 
33% (n=81) of the synaesthetes identified previously (n=248) reported experiencing some 
form of personification: the attribution of gender, personality, or both to graphemes.  
Compared to non-personifying synaesthetes, personifiers were more likely to associate a 
spatial pattern/form with the alphabet (66% synaesthetes vs. 77% personifiers), with 
numbers (56% synaesthetes vs. 68% personifiers) and in particular with days/months 
arrangement (37% synaesthetes vs. 77% personifiers). Finally, personifiers were more likely 
to like or dislike certain letters (66%) compared to non-personifying synaesthetes (45%).  
Can we estimate the prevalence of grapheme personification from our results? We find that 
nearly 1 in 3 synaesthetes in our database also report grapheme personification. Given that 
the best estimates of synaesthesia prevalence we currently have (Simner et al, 2006) range 
from 1.2% (for coloured graphemes) to 4.4% (for multiple variants), our data suggest a 
prevalence estimate of 0.4% to 1.5% for personification. The data may represent an 
overestimate given that the group of synaesthetes (from which the sample of personifiers is 
drawn) may not be representative of synaesthetes in the general population. For example, 
synaesthetes with multiple types of synaesthesia or more unusual variants may be more 
likely to contact us and volunteer to participate in research than those who have a single 
common variant of synaesthesia (e.g., coloured weekdays) and do not give it much thought. 
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Although only a small sample of participants in our questionnaire study were tested further 
(see next section), we are fairly satisfied that the responses are genuine. The rather detailed 
and typical responses given in our questionnaire (e.g., lengthy grapheme descriptions) leave 
little room for doubt, although we cannot be certain with respect to the two thirds of the 81 
synaesthetes who indicated they personified graphemes on a general synaesthesia 
screening questionnaire but for whom we have no further details. On the other hand, 
although we have not looked for non-synaesthetes who personify graphemes; such 
individuals, will increase the estimated prevalence of personification. Simner and Holenstein 
(2007) found 2 such individuals in a survey of 219. This should add an additional 1% to our 
estimate, bringing the total to a conservative estimate of at least 1.4%. However, a large 
scale study of the general population will be required in order to provide more precise 
estimates. 
Finally, 50% also reported mirror touch synaesthesia, an exceedingly high proportion 
(χ2(1)=54.33, p<0.05) compared with an expected proportion of 10.8% of the general 
population who report mirror touch in initial screening similar to ours (Banissy et al., 2009a), 
although it should be noted that upon further testing and verification 1.4% of the population 
are confirmed as genuine cases. Although we have not subjected individuals to follow up 
tests concerning mirror touch reports, given the large difference between the numbers 
initially reported, it seems likely that the prevalence of mirror touch may indeed be higher in 
individuals who personify graphemes (even more so considering that synaesthetes usually 
fill out our questionnaire with greater care than individuals drawn from an undergraduate 
participant pool, we expect fewer false positives). The high proportion we find is also higher 
than the 37% self-reported mirror touch synaesthetes among a sample of 46 synaesthetes 
who filled out our general synaesthesia questionnaire since we have added a question on 
mirror touch, although this difference failed to reach significance.  
To conclude, in this section, we provided a detailed account of the characteristics of 
grapheme personification in the largest group of such subjects studied to date. The self-
reported data provide us with a tentative list of factors that contribute to or interact with 
grapheme personification (e.g., colour, shape, letter frequency, or parity for numbers). 
Whether one is inclined to define grapheme personification as a type of synaesthesia or not, 
the co-occurrence of grapheme personification with other variants of synaesthesia is 
consistent with the suggestion that there may be some common underlying mechanisms. 
Before developing this line or argument further, let us examine more closely additional 
behavioural and neuroimaging evidence. 
 
Study 2: Are Gender and Personality Associations with Graphemes 
Consistent Over Time? 
Consistency is a fairly common finding in synaesthesia studies (e.g., Cytowic & Eagleman, 
2009). It is typically shown that synaesthetes are far more consistent than non-synaesthete 
controls who are asked to come up with similar correspondences. At least, this is the case 
for many types of synaesthesia studied so far, such as coloured-grapheme synaesthesia, 
gustatory-lexical, and others (e.g., Sagiv & Ward, 2006); however, thorough investigation of 
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personification has been limited to single case studies so far. Thus it is difficult to say 
whether personification also follows a highly consistent pattern in all individuals. To assess 
consistency we retested all synaesthetes who participated in our behavioural studies, 
comparing their gender/personality-grapheme associations with those they initially noted in 
their questionnaire responses. 
Methods 
Participants: Of the 34 individuals who completed our questionnaires, 11 synaesthetes (9 
females and 2 males) who personify graphemes were available to participate in further 
behavioural studies in our lab. Their mean age was 43. A control group of a further 11 
participants (mean age=29) was also tested.  
Procedure: Synaesthetes and controls were given a sheet of paper with the letters A-Z and 
digits 0-9. Synaesthetes were asked to provide gender and personality descriptions where 
appropriate (i.e., leave personality blank if they only associated gender). The control group 
participants were also asked to associate a gender and a brief personality description with 
each one. The following instruction was given: “We would like you to think about letters and 
numbers as if they were people and describe below the gender and some personality traits 
that you think may go best with each letter and number”. The synaesthetes’ responses were 
compared against their questionnaire responses given at least 4 weeks earlier (several 
months for some participants). Control participants repeated the test after a period of 
between 24 hours to one week from the initial testing. Therefore synaesthetes performance 
was tested under more demanding conditions (longer test-recall intervals). 
Data Analysis: Gender consistency simply represents the percentage of ‘same’ gender 
responses. Personality similarity rating was conducted by three independent observers. 
They were asked to provide us with a binary decision regarding each pair of descriptions – 
whether or not it seemed reasonable that the two descriptions referred to the same person. 
The personality consistency score thus refers to the proportion of positive responses (for 
example, the raters found it reasonable that descriptors such as “ordinary” and “boring” 
referred to the same person, but rejected the pair “strong” and “indecisive” given by a 
participant on separate occasions). The majority decision was accepted when rating was not 
unanimous. 
Results and Discussion 
Synaesthetes consistency scores are given in Table 2. Synaesthetes who personify 
graphemes scored within a relatively wide range of 42% to 97%. This is comparable with 
what Simner et al (THIS ISSUE) have found in a sample of 5 individuals. Using a similar 
methodology for rating consistency, we also find that personality consistency scores 
(average 70.4%) were significantly above the level obtained by the control group; t(8)=3.98, 
p<0.01. The complexity of personality descriptions probably contributed to the fact that 
personality consistency scores were lower than those typically found for colour consistency. 
It should be noted that the higher scores reported by Smilek et al (2007) in their single case 
study were obtained using a different methodology - a four-alternative forced choice test 
using different descriptions initially given by participants for graphemes. In contrast, the 
gender consistency scores for synaesthetes (70.5%) was not significantly higher than 
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controls (67%) although both scored above chance. Although some synaesthetes were 
highly consistent, the scores varied widely. The relatively high scores for gender consistency 
obtained by control group participants may be due to the relatively short time elapsed 
between the test and retest for controls (only 24 hours for some) and the relatively simple 
nature of the task (essentially a two-alternative forced choice task: male/female). It is also 
possible that control subjects have used certain heuristics in order to generate grapheme 
genders (e.g., graphemes with sharp angles are masculine and rounder shapes are 
feminine) thus making it possible for them to perform well on the task. 
 
Table 2.  Colour, gender, and personality consistency scores. 
Participant Sex Type of Personification Gender 
Consistency 
Personality 
Consistency 
Colour 
Consistency 
GP F Gender only 50 - 93 
AA F Gender only 100 - 100 
JD F Personality only - 42 93 
SK F Personality only - 83 100 
VR F Personality only - 73 93 
KB F Gender +  Personality 87 61 94 
JH M Gender +  Personality 80 97 96 
BM F Gender +  Personality 85 66 89 
SR M Gender +  Personality 42 80 95 
JT F Gender +  Personality 38 65 100 
LD F Gender +  Personality 82 67 78 
Mean (Synaesthetes) 70.5 70.4 93.7 
Mean (control group n=11) 67.0 49.9 - 
 
 
Although traditionally, consistency has been accepted as a diagnostic criterion for 
synaesthesia, there is no apriori reason to assume that all synaesthesia variants are 
characterised by high consistency, or that less-consistent individuals excluded from previous 
studies (in the interest of obtaining a conservative estimate of prevalence) do not experience 
synaesthesia. Indeed, concerns have recently been raised regarding the circularity in 
arguing for consistency as an essential feature of synaesthesia (Simner, 2011). We find it 
unlikely that synaesthetes with reliable synaesthetic colour associations confabulate only 
when it comes to talking about grapheme personification. It may be that personification is 
more flexible than synaesthetic colour associations. Just as one can add on to what they 
know about a person, how they judge their character or feel about him or her – one can 
presumably also update the persona associated with a grapheme. This may be expected 
when higher-level processing is involved.  
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Importantly, 3 of the 11 synaesthetes have indicated to us that their personification was 
rather fluid compared with other synaesthetic correspondences (2 on their questionnaires, 
and one spontaneously noted this during the re-test). Two of them have noted they were 
aware that changes in grapheme personification depended to some extent on their mood 
and stress level. This undoubtedly contributed to the wide range of scores and lower 
consistency rates in some cases. Having interviewed the synaesthetes who report 
personification, we are confident that they did understand our questions and instructions and 
have no reason to doubt that these are genuine cases. However, we did proceed with 
caution and have only incorporated consistent grapheme-gender pairs in the following 
reaction time study.  
 
 
Study 3: Reaction Time Study - The Behavioural Correlates of 
Grapheme Personification  
Synaesthetes have provided us with a wealth of insights into the phenomenon, including the 
conditions under which grapheme personification occurs, what influences the features 
associated with graphemes, and what are some of the associated conditions. However, it is 
important to accompany self reports with objective measures in order to corroborate the 
reports.  
One feature that distinguishes between synaesthesia and ordinary mental-imagery is the 
automaticity with which synaesthetic experiences are elicited (e.g., Sagiv & Ward, 2006). 
This appears to hold in the case of personification based on self-reports as well as 
behavioural studies (Simner & Holenstein, 2007; Smilek et al, 2007). To demonstrate the 
automaticity of synaesthetic correspondences, researchers have often used congruity 
paradigms (e.g., Beeli, Esslen, & Jäncke, 2005; Sagiv, Heer, & Robertson, 2006; Ward and 
Sagiv, 2007). In a typical experiment, the synaesthetic experience (e.g., synaesthetic colour) 
either matches or mismatches a property of the target stimulus or an irrelevant 
prime/distractor stimulus (e.g., surface colour on the screen); it is expected of course that 
reaction time (RT) will be slower in the mismatching than in the matching condition.  
We developed a simple novel paradigm for assessing the automaticity of grapheme 
personification. Participants were presented with an irrelevant grapheme prime, followed by 
a cartoon face (see Figure. 1). The task was to judge whether the cartoon face was a male 
or a female face. The target face was either congruent or incongruent with the gender they 
associated with the grapheme prime. We expected that synaesthetes who personify 
graphemes (but not controls) will show a slow-down of RT in incongruent trials compares 
with congruent ones.  
Methods 
Participants: Of the 11 individuals who were tested in our lab (Table 2), we invited those 
synaesthetes who consistently associate gender with at least some graphemes to take part 
in this experiment. Data from five synaesthetes (AA, KB, BM, JH, GP) is presented (an 
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additional synaeasthete was tested but subsequently excluded owing to a high error rate 
>20%). Two sex-matched control groups were tested, both drawn from a student participant 
pool. Five individuals in group 1 (mean age: 22), and eight in group 2 (mean age=20).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the trial structure. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure: Participants were seated 50cm away from a 14” cathode ray tube 
(CRT) monitor. Stimuli were presented centrally. Grapheme primes extended to a visual 
angle of 2°x2° and face targets extended 6°x6°. Participants were instructed to indicate 
whether the target face was a male or a female. Four different graphemes were used (2 
“male” and 2 “female” graphemes). These were tailored to each synaesthete; we only used 
graphemes that were consistently associated with a gender and that were ranked as 
inducing a strong experience in our questionnaire. Grapheme-gender association were 
verified a third time, just prior to testing. We avoided using the letters F and M to avoid 
priming due to a linguistic, rather than synaesthetic effect (with one exception – where the 
associations were the other way around - F was a [friendly] male, and M a [motherly] 
female). Each control participant in the first control group was assigned to grapheme-gender 
pairing of one synaesthete (thus, we have used the same 5 variants of the test in 
synaesthetes and controls.  
The second control group participants were encouraged to assign gender to graphemes and 
provide us with two graphemes which they thought are most suitable to have a male gender 
and two graphemes that seem to them most suitable to have a female gender. We then used 
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the pairing given to us by each subject to define the congruent and incongruent conditions 
for each one3.  
Four cartoon faces (2 males and 2 females) were generated on an Internet-based 
application (http://www.magixl.com/).  On each trial, following an inter-trial interval of 1sec, a 
fixation cross appeared for 400msec, followed by the letter prime for 250msec, followed by 
the target face presented until a response was made, for a maximum of 2sec (see Figure 1). 
There were 96 trials (half congruent and half incongruent). The responses were indicated by 
pressing the left or right mouse buttons (for female and male faces, respectively). Another 
synaesthete (FC) was tested using a version of the experiment with a ratio of 1:2 congrunet 
to incongruent trials in order to assess the presence of any strategic effects. 
Data Analysis: Error trials were excluded from the analysis. Outlier trials were also excluded 
from the analysis (RTs beyond 2.5SDs from the condition mean for each participant). Mean 
RTs in each condition (congruent, incongruent) of all participants were analysed using a 
mixed ANOVA with Congruency as a within-subject factor (congruent/incongruent) and 
Group as a between-subjects factor (synaesthetes/controls). In the version of the experiment 
in which we varied the ratio of congruent and incongruent trials testing a single subject, a 
recursive outlier rejection method was used (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994). 
Results and Discussion 
Reaction times in the gender judgement task are shown in Figure 2. On average, control 
subjects were faster (481msec) than synaesthetes who personify graphemes (589msec), 
F(1,8)=13.12, p<0.01.  Across groups, congruent trials were faster (msec) than incongruent 
trials (msec), F(1,8)=13.14, p<0.01; however this difference was much more pronounced in 
the synaesthetes (a 48 msec slow-down) than in the control group (a mere 9 msec 
difference). Indeed the interaction of Congruity and Group was significant: F(1,8)= 5.92, 
p<0.05. A planned comparison showed that for synaesthetes, congruent trials were 
significantly faster than incongruent ones (565msec and 612msec respectively), t(4)=3.54, 
p<0.05. These results show that the gender synaesthetes associate with graphemes 
produces a reliable interference with subsequent gender judgements even when graphemes 
are task-irrelevant. This confirms synaesthetes’ self-report that personification occurs 
automatically. Indeed all 5 synaesthetes show this effect (with mean RT differences ranging 
from 20 to 99 msec). The paradigms provides a simple and reliable behavioural index of 
grapheme personification that does not require interference effects to transfer from single 
letters to whole words - something that Simner and Holenstein (2007) find in a single case, 
but may or may not generalise to other synaesthetes. 
                                                           
3
 The rationale for testing a second control group is that while both synaesthetes and the first control group 
participants were unaware of the specific hypotheses and purpose of the experiment, synaesthetes did have a 
general idea that this had something to do with their grapheme personification and may have been primed to 
process this information although it was task-irrelevant. Furthermore, the first control group participants were 
simply assigned to pairing of grapheme-gender chosen by synaesthetes, thus they could not have “benefitted” 
from any associations they may have had between graphemes and gender. If, however, there is nothing special 
about people who personify grapheme and anyone could choose to think of certain graphemes as males or 
females, then our second control group participants - who were allowed to choose their own grapheme-gender 
pairs - should show a pattern similar to that shown by synaesthetes. We thank Lynn Robertson for this 
suggestion 
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Figure 2. Reaction times (in milliseconds) in congruent and incongruent trials. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
There are, however, a number of alternative explanations that we must rule out before 
proceeding. First, is it possible that synaesthetes are showing this effect merely because 
they were allowed to choose their grapheme-gender correspondences, while controls were 
not? This is unlikely because our second control group participants (who did choose their 
own pairs) do not show the congruity effect shown by synaesthetes. In fact the opposite is 
true: Their congruent trials were 5 msec slower than incongruent ones (523 msec and 517 
msec, respectively); however this difference was not significant [t(7)=1.33, n.s.]. This is 
consistent with our conclusion that grapheme personification entails more than deliberate 
engagement in mental imagery.  
A second concern is that the congruity effect may be due to strategic effects. Synaesthetes 
may prepare their responses based on the prime gender even though they are told that the 
prime is irrelevant. This is unlikely to be the case given the short inter-stimulus-interval 
(250ms). Furthermore, we also observed the priming effect in an additional synaesthete (FC) 
who was given a modified test with a higher proportion of incongruent trials. In such a case, 
it would be to the participant’s advantage to ignore the letter prime and forsake any strategic 
preparations to respond based on the gender of the prime (he was alerted that there would 
be more incongruent trials and it is to his advantage to completely ignore the prime). 
However, he still showed a decent congruity effect of 128msec (Congruent mean RT= 
1003msec; Incongruent RT=1131msec). This congruity effect was not smaller than the one 
observed with an equal number of congruent and incongruent trials (an 87msec different)  
A third concern is that it is difficult to trace the origins of the association of gender and 
specific graphemes. For example, might the effect be mediated by colour? Although colours 
were not presented or referred to in our experiment, is it still possible that the association 
between gender and letters we observed was in fact secondary to an association between 
the synaesthetic colour and gender? Our participants do indicate that colour may bias 
gender associations with graphemes, alongside other factors. For example, darker colours 
might be associated with masculinity. We find it unlikely that gender priming is secondary to 
the synaesthetic colour because it is at odds with the self reported experience of 
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synaesthetes. These explicitly include gender. Furthermore, some individuals associate 
gender with graphemes but not colour (Simner & Holenstein, 2007), hence the two 
phenomena can exist independently.  
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out altogether the possibility that such effects were due to 
certain strong associations between colour and gender or associations of the letters with 
names of familiar individuals. In Appendix 1, we provide a full breakdown the letters used in 
the experiment and their associated colours. It is evident that a dark-male / light-female 
association could have contributed to all but AA’s congruity effects. 
Whatever their source might be, the observed congruity effects support the conclusion that 
gender is automatically primed by graphemes. There may well be a role for learned 
associations here but we suspect that such association bias the correspondences between 
certain graphemes and genders, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility of a direct 
linkage between graphemes and genders.  
 
 
Study 4: Is Grapheme Personification Associated with Heightened 
Empathy? 
If personification relies on some of the same mechanisms underlying normal social 
cognition, it would be useful to probe these skills in individuals who personify in order to 
constrain possible explanations for the phenomenon. We chose to begin by focusing on 
empathy. At first glance, heightened empathy or excessive concern for understanding or 
considering the feeling of others could account for a tendency to personify. This may be 
expected given the relatively high rate of mirror-touch self-report in personifiers (heightened 
empathy has been demonstrated in mirror-touch; Banissy & Ward, 2007). However, the 
relationship between empathy and personification may not be straightforward: Could 
personifying objects come at the expense of normal social cognition? If the ‘concern’ for 
inanimate things is drawing resources that could have otherwise been used in a social 
context, we may see lower empathy scores4. Alternatively, the impact may be restricted to 
the domain of processing graphemes. This may be turn out to be the case if grapheme 
personification is due to localised cross-wiring between otherwise normally developed 
modules. In such a case, empathy scores may be in the normal range. Individual differences 
may yet present additional challenges to the interpretation of empathy scores. 
To assess whether empathy played a role in grapheme personification, we have asked 
participants to complete the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
                                                           
4
 Although causality is difficult to establish, it is possible that, in some cases, synaesthesia might develop at the 
expense of other functions. For example, there seems to be an association between synaesthesia and arithmetic 
difficulties (Cytowic, 2002; Ward, Sagiv, & Butterworth, 2009) although it should be noted that and that there 
may be substantial individual differences. For example, coloured-graphemes could pose certain challenges 
during learning for some children (Green & Goswami, 2008) but the same type of synaesthesia may not be a 
significant hindrance to others; on the contrary, the late physicist and Nobel laureate Richard Feynman found it 
helpful to see equations in colour (Day, 2005). Additionally, synaesthesia may well confer some advantages, for 
example, in memory (e.g., Yaro & Ward, 2007).  
Journal of Neuropsychology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp 255-282 
 
Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). Participants also completed the 
Systemising Quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 
2003), quantifying the tendency to analyse or construct systems. Both tests were developed 
in the context of the study of autism spectrum conditions. In previous research females were 
shown to score higher than males on the EQ and low on the SQ; furthermore, individuals 
with Asperger Syndrome or high-functioning autism show an extremely low EQ and 
extremely high SQ scores (Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2004).   
Methods 
We tested 10 individuals (8 females and 2 males) who took part in our behavioural studies. 
Participants were given a paper copy of the EQ and SQ. Half of them were given the EQ first 
and half were given the SQ first. Scoring was done in accordance with Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright (2004) and Baron-Cohen et al. (2003). Mean scores were compared against 
the normative data from those studies. Male and female participants were considered 
separately. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Individual EQ scores (upper graphs) and SQ score (lower graphs) for two male 
synaesthetes (on the left) and eight female synaesthetes (on the right). The dashed 
horizontal lines represent population averages obtained by Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, 
Gurunathan, and Wheelwright (2003; sample sizes were 114 males and 164 females). 
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Results and Discussion 
The individual scores are shown in Figure 3 and present a complex picture. The two male 
participants both scored fairly low - an average of 22.5 on the EQ (1.3 standard deviations 
[SDs] below the normal male average of 38.8). Only one of them SR also has an 
exceptionally high SQ score (61; some 2.7SDs from the normal male average of 30.3). The 
female group presents a more heterogeneous picture with five participants scoring above the 
expected female average (47.7) on the EQ (ranging from 53-63); one obtained an average 
score (48) and two participants scored below average on empathy (one of them JD scores 
exceptionally low - 2.8SDs below the average female EQ score and exceptionally high on 
the SQ – 3.4SDs from the average female score of 24.1). On average our 8 female 
participants scored 48.5, only slightly the average EQ score 47.7 reported by Baron-Cohen 
et al, (2003), however this difference was not significant [t(7)=0.151, n.s.]. The male sample 
(n=2) is admittedly too small to be considered representative of synaesthetes who personify. 
From this mixed pattern of results we cannot conclude that as a group, personifying 
synaesthetes exhibit heightened empathy. Three out of ten participants scored substantially 
lower than the average. At the very least this demonstrates that heightened empathy is not 
necessary for personifying graphemes. The presence of the extreme scores obtained by JD 
in such a small sample hints that we may not be sampling from a normal distribution 
(although a larger sample will be required to properly assess normality). This highlights once 
again the importance of individual differences in synaesthesia (Dixon & Smilek, 2005, Ward, 
Li, Salih, & Sagiv 2007; Barnett et al, 2008; Rouw & Scholte, 2010). Future studies 
attempting to probe social cognition in synaesthetes or the mechanisms of personification 
should not ignore these individual differences.  
It is an intriguing possibility that there may be two different developmental pathways to 
grapheme personification resulting in a bi-modal distribution: One group with highly sensitive 
mechanisms for social cognition indulges in personification in unusual contexts. Individuals 
in the other group exhibit poorer social skills, grapheme personification may represent an 
inadequate mentalising process; a failure to pick up crucial behavioural cues in human 
interaction may result in indiscriminate personification of both human and inanimate things. 
In these individuals the attribution of feelings or intentions may be based on more superficial 
features of the evoking stimulus). 
It is fair to say that these hypotheses are somewhat speculative, however, they are testable. 
In the future, we should seek to test larger samples, attempt to eliminate possible sampling 
biases (the present sample is self-referred), and test directly a range of social skills. We feel 
that the most promising approach may be a prospective developmental study following up on 
samples of children with poor, average, and high social skills.  
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Study 5: Neural Basis of Grapheme Personification 
If cross-wiring any two sensory brain areas results in some variety of synaesthesia (e.g., 
Hubbard, Brang, & Ramachandran, in press), what would be the outcome if a similar 
process were to link other neural systems? Given the similarities between coloured-
grapheme synaesthesia and grapheme personification, it is tempting to hypothesize that 
personification is one possible outcome: A synaesthesia-like process linking grapheme 
recognition with some of the mechanisms underlying social cognition.  
Previous neuroimaging studies (e.g., Castelli et al, 2000) demonstrate that we utilise similar 
mechanisms when personifying human agents and non-human objects. Smilek et al. (2007) 
list a number of candidate areas for the anthropomorphisation of objects, including the 
fusiform gyrus, anterior temporal lobe/amygdale, posterior parts of the temporo-parietal 
junction (angular gyrus), and the medial frontal cortex. All areas have been implicated in 
certain aspects of social cognition including face and gaze perception, theory of mind, and 
processing of information concerning the self. The majority of individuals we interviewed so 
far, do not seem to associate faces with objects and therefore may not involve the fusiform 
face area (Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun, 1997). The amygdala may serve a modulating 
function in signaling significance of socially relevant information (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2002) and may well be implicated in anthropomorphism (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004). The 
medial prefrontal lobe is associated with ‘theory of mind’ (e.g., Siegal & Varley, 2002) 
although it may not be necessary (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004). One of the 
functions associated with the posterior temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) besides theory of 
mind, is the ‘feeling of presence’ (e.g., Arzy et al., 2006).  We may add to this list three 
additional areas: the insula, implicated in empathy (for a review see Decety & Jackson, 
2006), the precuneus, associated with self reference and self reflection (Lou, Nowak, & 
Kjaer., 2005; Cavanna, 2007), and the retrosplenial cortex, implicated in access to 
biographical information about familiar individuals (e.g., Shah et al, 2001). The latter may be 
particularly relevant in the case of grapheme personification given that letters and numbers 
are associated with rich biographical information such as gender, age, occupation, etc. We 
present here data from a single case of a synaesthete who personifies graphemes, providing 
us with some preliminary insights into the possible neural mechanisms of personification.  
Methods  
Participant: AA is a 38 year old right handed female. She is highly educated (PhD in the 
humanities) but mildly dyscalculic and right-left confused but has superior verbal skills. She 
has colour grapheme synaesthesia, number forms, and attributes genders to about half of 
the letters of the alphabet. This makes her an ideal case study since we are able to compare 
brain activation to letters that are either associated with a gender or not (i.e., contrast 
personified letters with a control condition utilising stimuli that are closely matched in every 
aspect except personification).  
 Procedure: We presented AA with letter stimuli (shown for 1000msec, followed by 200msec 
blank screen). 16 blocks with 16 letter stimuli within each block were presented in one 
experimental session. We alternated between blocks in which all the letters had genders and 
blocks in which letters did not have genders. AA’s task was to detect the presence of letter 
repetition (1-back task) to maintain attention. Since grapheme gender was task-irrelevant, 
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any activation we may find there represents automatic processing that may be associated 
with personification. 
Data acquisition and analysis: Brain images were acquired with a 3T MRI scanner (Siemens 
Magnetom Trio; www.siemens.com) equipped with an 8-channel array headcoil. Functional 
images of the entire brain were acquired continuously during each experimental run with a 
standard gradient-echo, echoplanar sequence (TR 2000 msec, 34 slices, voxel size 3 x 3 x 3 
mm, 64 x 64 matrix, axial orientation). These were acquired continuously during each 
experimental run. A high-resolution (1mm) 3D anatomical scan (MP-RAGE, Siemens) of the 
whole brain was also acquired. The data were analysed using SPM5. 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). To correct for head motion, each functional volume was 
realigned to match the first volume acquired. Anatomical and functional scans were 
normalised to the standard Montreal Neurological Instiute (MNI) stereotactic space. Finally, 
the spatially normalised functional scans were smoothed with a 6mm isotropic Gaussian 
filter. Models of the expected timecourses were generated with SPM5, utilising the standard 
haemodynamic response function. The resulting statistical images were thresholded at 
p<0.05 (Family-wise error [FWE] correction). 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 4 shows brain activation found when we contrasted letters with and without gender. 
The comparison of those closely-matched stimuli only yields precuneus activation (MNI 
coordinates [0 -69 39]; p=0.003 FWE corrected), suggesting that OLP may represent an 
aberration of self-reflection and/or mental imagery although the absence of additional 
activations in a single case study should always be interpreted with caution.  
AA only attributes gender to letters, but not very elaborate mental states. As noted earlier, 
the precuneus is associated with self reference and self reflection. Is it possible that 
personifying graphemes (or inanimate objects) serves the function of projecting one’s own 
feelings? This suggestion would be consistent with observations and comments provided by 
some of our participants who indicated that while some features were stable (such as 
graphemes’ gender or colour), other aspects, such as graphemes’ moods tended to vary 
with their one mental state. This would certainly be an interesting line of investigation, 
however, a more straightforward explanation is that the observed precuneus activation is 
related to polymodal mental imagery (for a review see, Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). The 
process of personifying graphemes certainly requires imaginative capacity (regardless of 
whether it is intentional or an automatic process as seems to be the case in our participants). 
The precuneus has recently been implicated in other types of synaesthesia involving visual 
(Nunn et al., 2002; Specht & Laeng, in press; Steven, Hansen & Blakemore, 2006; Weiss, 
Shah, Toni, Zilles & Fink, 2001) and gustatory experiences (Jones et al., in press). Jones 
and her colleagues showed that the precuneus activation co-varied with the intensity of 
synaesthetic taste reports and speculated that the precuneus may be associated with the 
intensity but not the specific nature of the experience. The fact that we see in AA activation 
of the precuneus without additional unimodal areas is consistent with AA’s descriptions: 
When she personifies letters, she ‘just knows’ whether they are males or females without 
Journal of Neuropsychology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp 255-282 
 
imagining seeing them or hearing them5. The activation of the precuneus also reinforces the 
idea that grapheme personification may well be a variant of synaesthesia, sharing a core 
underlying mechanism with other more conventional types of synaesthesia.  
It is premature to conclude from this single case that activation in other nodes in the social 
cognition network is absent. In particular, it remains to be seen whether other synaesthetes 
with more elaborate OLP descriptions, including personalities and attitudes do engage 
additional brain areas such as the medial prefrontal and temporal-parietal regions or perhaps 
inferior parietal and inferior frontal regions engaged in personality judgements (Heberlein 
and Saxe, 2005) as suggested by Simner and Hubbard (2006). Preliminary results from our 
ongoing study indicate that the insula is also activated, in addition to the precuneus, in 
individuals who attribute both gender and personality (Sobczak, Sagiv, & Williams, 2011). At 
the very least, this case study reinforces our conviction that peculiar as it may first appear, 
grapheme personification can be studied systematically in the laboratory, and may provide 
new insights into creative processes in the human brain. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Brain activation in AA, comparing letters with which she associated gender with 
letters with which she does not associate gender (p<0.05 FWE corrected).  Crosshair shows 
precuneus activation located at MNI coordinates [0, -69, 39]. 
 
                                                           
5
 We have only come across anecdotal reports of individuals who actually visualise a face when they personify 
but have not been able to follow these up in the laboratory due to geographical constraints. 
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General Discussion  
We have known for over a hundred years that some individuals attribute gender or 
personality to letters and numbers (e.g., Calkins, 1895). Individuals who personify 
graphemes are more likely to experience coloured grapheme synaesthesia (Simner & 
Holenstein, 2007). Our data also suggest that such an association of the two phenomena is 
likely – 1 in 3 coloured-grapheme synaesthetes also appears to personify graphemes. Our 
prevalence estimates point to a conservative prevalence estimate of 1.4% of the population. 
This is a non-negligible minority but this would need to be corroborated in a larger scale 
survey. 
We also find an association with other synaesthesia variants including mirror touch 
synaesthesia and spatial variants such as number forms. Personification not only co-occurs 
with synaesthesia variants, it also shares much in common with synaesthesia. 
Personification is induced by ordinal sequences, it is present from early childhood, it is 
automatically elicited and influences processing of concurrent-related information (in this 
case gender). Personification patterns appear to be consistent at least in some individuals, 
although at present we cannot rule out that in some instances of grapheme personification, 
the specific correspondences between letters and gender/personality may vary with time. 
Some synaesthetes’ comments indicate that their graphemes’ state of mind may vary with 
their own. Others have noted that the specific characters associated with each grapheme 
may depend on their synaesthetic colour. 
We provided here data from a simple novel behavioural paradigm for corroborating 
synaesthetes’ reports. Our data (from a group of 5 individuals) strongly suggest that 
grapheme personification occurs automatically, supporting the conclusions reached by 
Simner and Holenstein (2007) and Smilek et al (2007) in their single case studies. 
Now that we have a better grasp of the phenomenology of grapheme personification, and we 
have been able to provide objective correlates of the reported experiences, the biggest 
challenge remains explaining how personification occurs and what the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms are. Our preliminary brain imaging data investigation in a single subject reveals 
activation in the precuneus, an area previous associated with mental imagery as well as self-
referential processing (e.g., Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Both of these functions may provide 
some clues to understanding grapheme personification. Mental imagery received 
surprisingly little attention in the recent synaesthesia literature with few exceptions (e.g., 
Rich et al, 2006). However, synaesthesia could be considered a special case of mental 
imagery that happens to be elicited automatically, involuntarily, has a well defined trigger 
and seems to be more constrained and restricted to specific modalities. It remains to be 
seen whether mental imagery is the missing link between ordinary perceptual experience 
and synaesthesia, however we should note that evidence is mounting for precuneus 
involvement in other types of synaesthesia (for a discussion see Jones et al, THIS ISSUE). 
An alternative explanation links personification with self-processing. The idea that grapheme 
personification may represent an unusual form of projecting one’s own mental states 
remains speculative at this stage, but at the very least it reminds us the grapheme 
personification provides a very interesting test case for our understanding of certain key 
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social skills - how people encode and represent their own and other people’s intentions, 
beliefs and feeling. 
Considerable efforts are devoted to understanding the course of development of these 
capabilities and their underlying neural bases (e.g., Frith & Frith, 2007). It has been 
suggested that a failure to intuitively interpret and predict other people’s behaviour on the 
basis of their mental states is a key feature in autism (for a critical review see Tager-
Flusberg, 2007). Indeed, we have learnt a great deal from studying failures to understand 
other minds in atypically developed populations; however, the “fantasy world” of otherwise 
normal individuals who consistently attribute mental states to non-living things is virtually 
ignored. We propose that grapheme personification and animistic thought represents 
instances of benign hyper-mentalising that must be accounted for if we are to understand 
mentalising. 
Our attempt to determine whether heightened empathy can account for grapheme 
personification has revealed a complex picture highlighting substantial individual difference 
in our group of synaesthetes with grapheme personification. We suggested that there may 
be two different developmental routes to grapheme personification, one representing an 
exaggeration or extension of normal processes (from the domain of human interaction to 
other domains), while the other could represents impaired criteria for personification, or 
sensitivity to the “wrong” cues. This is another line of study that we are currently exploring. 
Another problem for future research is to understand better animistic thought and its 
relationship to normal cognition, to grapheme personification (and experiences such as 
sense of presence; e.g., Blanke, Arzy, & Landis, 2008). Animism may represent a sense of 
presence that is triggered by and projected onto objects in the environment. As such, it may 
well present us with another clue to the involvement of self-processing in personification (self 
projection has been linked with a sense of presence; Brugger, Regard, & Landis, 1997). 
In conclusion, grapheme personification is a fascinating phenomenon co-occurring with 
synaesthesia. It appears to be a variant of synaesthesia albeit a non-sensory one. The 
phenomenological, behavioural, and neuroimaging data we present here also support this 
conclusion. We suggest that grapheme personification, rather than a peculiar set of claims to 
be dismissed, is a goldmine for social cognitive neuroscientists and cognitive 
neuropsychologists alike.  
We would like to end with this final thought: Could other categories be personified besides 
ordinal sequences? We suspect that the useful term ordinal-linguistic-personification (OLP) 
might prematurely narrow the search for other types of personification. Since concluding this 
study, we have heard from individuals who personify categories such as the violin strings, or 
body parts, including for example, teeth and fingers. We suspect that personification of the 
genitalia may be relatively common albeit not a topic of conversation in polite company 
(teenage boys excluded). It became clear from our questionnaire study that many individuals 
also personified various object categories. We have not asked about food (except fruits and 
vegetables) but while browsing Chef Paul Bertolli’s cookbook we couldn’t help but notice that 
the book ends with a short play in which the characters are not people but different foods 
and wines. He notes that if food and wine could talk, “any meal could become theater” 
(Bertolli, 2003, p. 253). Indeed, like personified graphemes, different foods and wines get 
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along with some but certainly not all of their peers. In Bertolli’s play, the Barolo accuses the 
oxtails “you are too soft for me”; but the oxtails reply “Any meat would be” (Bertolli, 2003, p. 
258). If this is not a novel type of personification, it is certainly an interesting exercise in 
demonstrating the universal appeal of make-believe personification.  
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Appendix 1:  Synaesthetic associations of the letters used in the reaction time study. 
 
Participant Letters used Gender Colour 
    
AA A Female Red-pink 
 X Female Blue  
 B Male Yellow 
 P Male Blue  
    
BM E Female Pink 
 L Female Yellow 
 G Male Silver 
 P Male Brown 
    
GP G Female Pink 
 K Female Dark purple 
 E Male Mid blue 
 N Male Rust brown/tan 
    
JH G Female White-grey 
 K Female Yellow -ochre 
 J Male Blue dark   
 N Male Black 
    
KB L Female Mid green 
 8 Female Pink smooth 
 Y Male Pale  
 P Male Black with dots 
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